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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor made
payment of a bona fide debt by a check mailed on November
18, dated November 19 and honored by the bank on
November 20.  For purposes of Section 547, the payment
was not an avoidable transfer if made before November 20.
The court held that the date of a payment for preferential
transfer purposes was the date the check was honored by the
bank; therefore, the payment was avoidable. Barnhill v .
Johnson, 112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992), aff'g , 9 3 1
F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  The IRS filed a pre-petition
tax lien and notice of levy against an account receivable of
the debtor.  The debtor sought use of the account receivable
as cash collateral during the bankruptcy case but the IRS
argued that the levy removed any interest of the debtor in the
property.  The court held that the account receivable was
estate property subject to use as cash collateral until the
property was sold at a tax sale.  In re  Anaheim Elec .
Motor, Inc., 137 B.R. 791 (Bankr. C.D. Cal .
1992) .
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS .  The debtor, an
agricultural equipment dealer sought to assume dealership
contracts with the equipment manufacturer, under which the
manufacturer provided floor plan financing and financing of
purchases by customers.  The manufacturer argued that
Section 365(c)(2) prevented assumption of the contracts
because the contracts involved financial accommodation of
the debtor.  The court held that the financing arrangements
were only incidental to what were primarily business
arrangement contracts and the debtor was allowed to assume
the contracts.  In re Cole Bros., Inc., 137 B.R. 6 4 7
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
EARNINGS.  As part of its efforts to collect on a
judgment, the plaintiff attached the proceeds of the sale of
milk by the debtor to a dairy.  The debtor objected, arguing
that the milk proceeds were exempt from attachment as
earnings under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.010.  The court held
that the proceeds of the sale of milk were not earnings
eligible for the exemption.  Rice, Seiller, et al. v .
Fitzgerald, 824 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. Ct. App.
1992) .
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed a residence as a
homestead.  The debtor had once lived in the residence
fulltime but moved to two other houses which the debtor
built in attempts to sell the houses.  After the other houses
were sold, the debtor moved back to the residence which was
rented out during the debtor's absence.  The court held that
the debtor could claim the residence as an exempt
homestead. The debtor did not abandon the residence as a
homestead because the debtor always intended to move back
once the other houses were sold.  In re  Inmom, 1 3 7
B.R. 757 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
The debtors sold their Oregon homestead after moving to
Colorado to obtain work.  The debtors sought exemption of
the proceeds under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-201 which
provided for an exemption of proceeds of a homestead
located in Colorado.  Notwithstanding the literal language of
the exemption statute, the court held that the proceeds would
be exempt as fullfilling the purposes of the homestead
exemption.  In re  Bloedon, 137 B.R. 824 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1992).
LIEN AVOIDANCE.  The farm debtors sought to avoid
a lien against the proceeds of farm machinery because the
lien impaired their exemption in the farm machinery.  The
lien creditor argued that the exemption, under Wis. Stat. §
815.18(2)(h), was not allowed because the debtors had no
equity in the machinery and the lien was consensual.  The
creditor also argued that because Wisconsin had not "opted
out" of the federal exemptions, the Wisconsin limitations
on the exemption were permissable because the debtors
could elect to use the federal exemptions for lien avoidance
purposes.  The court held that under Owen v. Owen, 111
S.Ct. 1833 (1991), a state limitation on an exemption did
not affect the lien avoidance provisions of federal bankruptcy
law; therefore, the lien could be avoided.  In re  Wink,
137 B.R. 297 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1992).
In divorce proceedings, the debtor's former husband's
attorney obtained a charging interest against the former
husband's interest in the marital residence.  Under the
divorce settlement, the debtor obtained the former husband's
interest in the property subject to the charging lien.  The
court held that the debtor could not avoid the lien as
impairing the homestead exemption because the lien
attached before the debtor obtained an interest in the
property. In re  Donovan, 137 B.R. 547 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1992).
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The debtor sought to avoid liens against the debtor's
firearms as exempt household goods.  The court held that
firearms were not household goods for purposes of lien
avoidance.  In re  McGreevy, 955 F.2d 957 (4th
Cir. 1992), aff'g, 130 B.R. 200 (D. Me. 1991).
The debtor sought to avoid a judicial lien as impairing
the debtor's homestead exemption. The court held that the
lien could be avoided only to the extent of the homestead
exemption.  In addition, the court held that because, under
Illinois law, a judicial lien could not attach to a debtor's
homestead exemption, the judicial lien in this case did not
impair the exemption; therefore, the lien could not be
avoided in any amount.  In re  Cerniglia, 137 B . R .
722 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor listed as exempt an unknown
amount of an award from a pending job discrimination suit.
The trustee did not object to the exemption because the
trustee did not think the suit had any value.  After the suit
brought a substantial award, the trustee filed a late objection
of the exemption as not allowed under state law and sought
recovery of an amount sufficient to pay all unsecured
creditors.  The court held that an exemption would be
allowed if no timely objection was made, even if the
exemption did not have a good faith basis in law.  Taylor
v. Freeland & Kronz, 137 B.R. 14 (ye l low) ,
1992 W.L. 77247 (S. Ct. 1992).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS.  Within 90 days
prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy, the SBA applied
to the IRS for administrative setoff, under 31 U.S.C. §
3720A, of a tax refund due to the debtor.  The court held
that payment of the tax refund amount to the SBA was an
avoidable preferential transfer because the set off debt lacked
mutuality of obligation in that the IRS and SBA were not
the same governmental unit.  In re Hancock, 137 B . R .
835 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992).
  CHAPTER 12  
CASH COLLATERAL. The debtors operated a cattle
feedlot operation in which the debtors fed cattle owned by
others in exchange for a per head per day fee plus feed costs.
Much of the feed was produced by the debtors on the farm.
The debtors also rented to others a second residence on the
property.  A creditor held a security interest in the farm,
equipment, crops and proceeds.  The farm mortgage provided
for payment of rents and profits in case of default.  The
debtor sought use of the collateral in the operation of the
feedlot during the bankruptcy case.  The court held that the
income from the feedlot per head per day fees was not cash
collateral under the farm mortgage because the cattle owners
obtained no interest in the farm realty from the fees.  The
court also held that the cattle fees were not subject to the
U.C.C. security interest because the fees were generated by
the efforts of the debtors and not the sale of the collateral.
The debtor used hay and silage grown on the farm in the
feedlot operation and the court held that the crops were cash
collateral and that the debtors were required to pay the fair
market value of the crops to the creditor as the crops were
used in the operation.  The court held that the rent from the
second residence was cash collateral to the extent of the net
proceeds.  The court also held that the creditor was not
entitled to other adequate protection payments because the
value of the collateral was not declining.  In re
Anderson, 137 B.R. 819 (Bankr. D. C o l o .
1992) .
PLAN .  A creditor objected to the debtor's Chapter 12
plan as failing to provide unsecured creditors with as much
payment as would be received under a Chapter 7 liquidation.
The creditor argued that because the trustee would abandon
certain oversecured property to the debtor, the tax recognized
from the sale of the property would be a liability of the
debtor and not the estate; therefore, the Chapter 12 plan had
to provide for that reduced tax liability of the estate.  The
court held that the tax consequences of abandonment of
estate property had to be included in the Chapter 12 plan, if
the property would be abandoned in Chapter 7; however, the
court allowed the debtor to provide rebuttal as to whether the
property would be subject to abandonment.  Comment: As
the court noted, the only reason this issue arose was because
the debtor improperly included in the Chapter 12 plan
Section 1225(a)(4) liquidation analysis, the tax liability of
the estate for the sale of the overencumbered property;
whereas, the only property which should have been included
was unencumbered, non-exempt assets.  Query whether the
court was just as much in error in allowing a creditor to also
improperly increase the unsecured creditors' recovery under
the Chapter 7 liquidation analysis by excluding the tax
liability from the sale of oversecured property?  In re
Ayers, 137 B.R. 397 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
  CHAPTER 13  
ARREARAGES.  The Chapter 13 debtor's plan
provided for curing arrearages on an FmHA mortgage but did
not provide for payment of any accrued interest on the
arrearages because the mortgage agreement did not require
interest on any arrearages.  The court held that neither
Section 1322(b) nor § 1325(a)(5) required payment of
interest on arrearages on secured claims where the security
agreement did not contain any provision for payment of
interest.  In re  Sanchez, 137 B.R. 214 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 1992).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
AUTOMATIC STAY .  After the IRS had notice of
the debtor's bankruptcy filing and had filed claims in the
case, the IRS filed two notices of levy.  The court held that
under 11 U.S.C. § 106, the IRS had waived governmental
immunity and was subject to liability for the debtor's
attorney's fees and costs  which would be offset against the
IRS claims.  In re  Solis, 137 B.R. 121 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. 1992).
DISCHARGE.  The IRS had filed claims for taxes,
interest and penalties owed by the debtor.  The taxes and
interest were not dischargeable because the tax returns were
not filed more than three years before the bankruptcy filing;
however, some of the penalties were assessed against taxes
due more than three years before the bankruptcy filing.  The
court followed decisions in the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits
and held that Sections 523(a)(7)(A), (B) allow the discharge
of penalties assessed against taxes due more than three years
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before the bankruptcy filing. In re  Henderson, 1 3 7
B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1991).
The debtor was assessed in 1987 for taxes owed for 1985
and the assessed amount was eventually paid.  Within 240
days before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the IRS assessed
additional taxes for 1985 after an audit.  The debtor argued
that the second assessment related back to the first
assessment and was, therefore, dischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(A). The court held that the second assessment did
not relate back to the first assessment because the
assessment was for additional taxes.  In re  Blank, 1 3 7
Bankr. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
The debtor failed to timely pay federal income taxes for
several years and was assessed for the taxes, interest and
penalties prior to filing for bankruptcy.  The debtor had also
claimed many more exemptions on W-4 forms than were
allowed and were eventually claimed on income tax returns.
The IRS argued that the false W-4 form filing was sufficient
to declare the taxes nondischargeable, but the court held that
the false W-4 form in itself was insufficient without
evidence of the debtor's willing and knowing violation of
the law.  In addition, the court held that the taxes were not
nondischargeable simply because the debtor did not make
full payment of the taxes and filed bankruptcy as soon as the
taxes became dischargeable.  In re Peterson, 92-1 U.S.





BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The defendants defaulted
on a farm credit bank mortgage on their farm.  The farm was
eventually sold at auction with the homestead sold
separately and the remaining farm land sold as one parcel.
The mortgage included a waiver by the defendants of their
right to have the farm land sold in separate parcels.  The
defendants argued that the federal land bank could not bring a
state foreclosure suit because the bank was not registered
with the Secretary of State.  The court held that the bank
was a federally chartered corporation which was not
considered a foreign corporation in the state under N.D.
Cent. Code § 10-22-19.  The court also held as valid the
mortgage waiver of the defendant's right to have the farm
land sold in separate parcels. Farm Credit Bank of S t .
Paul v. Rub, 481 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1992).
The FmHA has announced interim regulations amending
the notices to delinquent Farmer Program borrowers to
include information about the Debt Settlement Programs
and changes to the Primary and Preservation Programs under
FACTA 1990.  57 Fed. Reg. 18612 (April 3 0 ,
1992) .
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has issued an interim
rule changing the classification of Florida from Class B to
Class A status under the brucellosis regulations. 57 Fed.
Reg. 15219 (April 27, 1992).
EMPLOYEES.  The plaintiffs were cotton farmers
whose fields were sprayed for boll weevils by a regional
agency participating in the federal boll weevil eradication
program.  The plaintiff brought suit for damages caused to
their cotton crops by employees of the regional agency.
The agency employees claimed to be de facto federal
employees because the whole program was created by a
federal statute.  The court held that if the employees were
federal employees, the suit could be prevented only if the
employees obtained certification of federal employment from
the United States Attorney General.  The court also held that
the USDA and APHIS were not indispensable parties
because the local agency had the authority to implement the
program independent of the federal agencies. Stewart v .
State Crop Pest Comm'n, 414 S.E.2d 121 ( S . C .
1992) .
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM .  Two Federal Land
Bank Associations applied for merger into an Agriculture
Credit Association covering ten counties, two of which were
also served by another FLB association.  The merging FLB
associations amended the proposed charter to allow only
short term lending in the counties served by the other FLB
association, but the Farm Credit Administration denied the
merger.  The court held that the denial was proper given the
FCA's identification of administrative, regulatory,
examination, supervisory and practical problems which
would have been created by a charter with bifurcated lending
practices.  Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit
Admin., 783 F.Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1991).
FARM LOANS .  The FmHA has adopted as final
regulations requiring a lien on all property owned by an
FmHA borrower when the borrower makes an FmHA
insured loan.  57 Fed. Reg. 18674 (April 2 0 ,
1992) .
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS .  The
FSIS has issued proposed regulations permitting the use of
ionizing radiation sources, i.e. irradiation, under FDA
regulations to treat (1) fresh or frozen uncooked whole
poultry carcasses or parts known as "ready to cook poultry"
and (2) mechanically separated poultry products. 57 Fed.
Reg. 19460 (May 6, 1992).
MILK MARKETING ORDERS .  The plaintiffs
were milk producers who challenged several milk marketing
orders as invalid because the effects of the orders were
contrary to the intent of the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.  The
USDA argued that the AMAA by implication prohibits
judicial review of complaints by milk producers.  The court
held that milk producers as well as handlers have a right to
judicial review of milk marketing orders and that these milk
producers had demonstrated sufficient injury to have standing
to challenge the orders.  Minnesota Milk Producers
Ass'n v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 816 (8th Cir .
1992) .
NATIONAL FORESTS .  As a result of the
economic downturn of the 1980's, timber companies which
had long term, high price timber cutting contracts with the
Forest Service were granted extensions on their contracts,
with a cutoff date for submission of amended contracts.  The
plaintiffs had such contracts but did not submit amended
plans before the deadline.  The Forest Service regulations
governing the extended contract program were enjoined by
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an injunction which was later overturned, but while the
injunction was in force, the plaintiffs submitted amended
contracts.  The plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service's
denial of the amended contracts as untimely submitted
violated the injunction.  The court held that the invalidation
of the injunction reinstated the original deadline, thus
making the amended contracts subject to rejection as
untimely. Hampton Tree Farm, Inc. v. Yeutter,
956 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1992).
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS.  The plaintiffs were
three joint venture farms which established 51 irrevocable
trusts in order to increase the number of "persons" eligible
for the $50,000 payment limitation on federal farm
programs.  The plaintiffs were allowed by the county ASCS
office to claim each trust as a separate person.  The USDA
investigated the plaintiff's case and issued a report to
Congress.  The chairman of the house agriculture committee
wrote a letter to the USDA expressing concern over the
plaintiffs' case as an abuse of the payment limitations
requirements.  The USDA then issued a ruling denying the
plaintiffs' status as separate persons as a scheme or device to
evade the payment limitations program. The plaintiffs
brought suit prior to exhaustion of administrative appeals,
alleging improper Congressional interference in the
administrative procedures.  The court held that the standard
in such cases was whether the Congressional
communication actually influenced the agency decision and
that the facts of this case did not amount to actual influence
but only Congressional comment and advice.  DCP
Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir .
1992) .
PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS . The plaintiffs
had been sued by the USDA for violations of the upland
cotton price support program and the plaintiff counter-
claimed for removal of their names from the federal debt
register and release of impounded money.  The USDA's suit
was dismissed because of the lapse of the statute of
limitations and the dismissal was upheld on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The cotton producers
brought suit in the Claims Court to have their names
removed from the debt roll and to have later subsidy
payments made to them which had been offset against the
original debt for violation of the price support program.
The court ruled that the dismissal of the USDA claim was
res judicata as to whether the plaintiffs violated the price
support program provisions and ordered removal of the
plaintiffs' names from the debt register and release of the
plaintiffs' funds.  The appellate court held that the dismissal
was not res judicata as to the propriety of the USDA to
offset the later subsidy payments against the amounts owed
for the alleged price support program violations and
remanded the case for adjudication on the merits.  Doko
Farms v. U.S., 956 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ,
rev'g and rem'g, 21 Ct. Cl. 696 (1990).
RICE.  The CCC has adopted as final the acreage
reduction from 1992 crop of rice at 10 percent. 57 Fed.
Reg. 15001 (April 24, 1992).
SALMONELLA.  The plaintiff was an egg producer
in whose flocks USDA inspectors found salmonella infected
chickens.  In accord with final regulations, the plaintiff was
banned from selling eggs produced on the farm as table
eggs, causing a loss from the lower price of eggs sold as
"breakers."  The plaintiff challenged the regulations as
violating the constitutional prohibition on governmental
takings without compensation and as arbitrary.  The District
Court held that the regulations were invalid because no
compensation was provided for the loss of value of a
quarantined farm and because the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to grant a compensation award.  The appellate
court reversed, holding that although the regulations did not
provide for compensation, the plaintiff could have sought
compensation through the Tucker Act and the Claims
Court.  Therefore, the lack of compensation was not a valid
reason for striking the regulations.  The court also upheld
the testing and tracing procedures of the regulations as
reasonable means to detect and control the disease.  Rose




GIFT.  The taxpayers lived together and pooled their
funds in cash in one person's purse.  A winning lottery
ticket was purchased with these pooled funds and the persons
agreed to split the prize.  The IRS ruled that the split of the
prize was not a gift from the purchaser to the other party.
Ltr. Rul. 9217004, date not given.
GROSS ESTATE.  In partial consideration for the
decedent's sister's care of the decedent's children, the decedent
helped the sister purchase a larger house until the sister's
previous house could be sold.  The sister repaid the decedent
for the amount the decedent provided.  The court held that
the house was not included in the decedent's gross estate
because the decedent had no control over possession under an
actual or implied agreement. Est. of Stavarkis v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-229.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
bequeathed as much property in trust to the surviving
spouse as would decrease the federal estate tax on the
remainder of estate property to the lowest amount possible.
The executor returned on Schedule M, Part 2, an amount
equal to 100 percent of the projected funding requirement for
the marital trust.  The IRS ruled that the executor made a
valid QTIP election for the fractional share of the marital
trust sufficient to reduce the estate tax to zero. Ltr. R u l .
9217005, Dec. 31, 1991.
The decedent's will bequeathed to a marital trust so much
of the estate property equal to the "maximum marital
deduction allowable by the Federal estate tax law applicable
to the Settlor's estate."  The decedent's will was last revised
in 1976.  The IRS ruled that the marital bequest was a
formula clause subject to the transitional rule of ERTA
1981 and limited the marital deduction to the greater of one-
half of the decedent's estate or $250,000. Ltr. R u l .
9217008, Jan. 6, 1992.
The decedent's will, last amended in 1977, bequeathed as
much property in trust to the surviving spouse as would
result in no federal estate tax liability for the estate.  The
IRS ruled that under Levitt v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 22 (1990),
the decedent's will was not subject to the transitional rule of
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ERTA 1981 and that the estate was entitled to the unlimited
marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9217030, Jan. 2 4 ,
1992 .
In filing Form 706 for an estate, the executor claimed a
marital deduction for a trust eligible as QTIP and identified
the trust but otherwise failed to properly complete Schedule
M.  The executor filed an amended Schedule M which
properly made the election and filed for an extension of time
to make the QTIP election.  The IRS ruled that good cause
and intent to originally make the election was shown and
the extension was granted. Ltr. Rul. 9217017, Jan.
23, 1992; Ltr. Rul. 9217025, Jan. 24, 1992;
Ltr. Rul. 9217028, Jan. 24, 1992.
TRUSTS.  The grantor transferred property in trust for
life to a daughter.  The trust provided that if the daughter
was survived only by adopted children, a portion of the trust
property would pass to such children in trust, with the
remainder passing to a charitable foundation.  The trustee
sold some appreciated stock belonging to the trust and
established two trust funds with a portion of the stock
allocated to the fund which would pass to the foundation if
the daughter left surviving adopted children.  The IRS ruled
that the taxable gains attributable to the sale of the stock in
the foundation trust fund were deductible from the taxable
income of the trust under I.R.C. § 642(c)(2). Ltr. R u l .
9217023, Jan. 24, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX .  The IRS has
adopted as final regulations governing the application of the
tax benefit rule to the minimum tax, effective for minimum
taxes which arose in taxable years beginning after December
31, 1975 and before January 1, 1987. 57 Fed. R e g .
19253 (May 5, 1992). .
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The donor
established an eight year charitable remainder annuity trust
which provided for annual payments of $6,400 to the donor,
age 85, or the donor's surviving spouse, age 80, with the
remainder to a charity.  The IRS ruled that the present value
of the retained annuity in August 1991 was $37,981.41.
Ltr. Rul. 9216006, Jan. 16, 1992.
C CORPORATIONS
ALLOCATION OF INCOME.  An agricultural
cooperative formed a subsidiary corporation to act as
distributor of the cooperative's products in some states.  The
cooperative controlled all aspects of the corporation's
activities and the income from the corporation was allocated
entirely to the cooperative.  The IRS ruled that income
generated by the corporation's sales were to be allocated to
the corporation because the corporation did not act as an
agent for the cooperative in making the sales. Ltr. R u l .
9217003, Nov. 21, 1991.
HOBBY LOSSES.  The taxpayers were employed full
time as pipefitters and worked on their horse farm before and
after work and on weekends.  The court held that the horse
breeding activity was not operated with the intent to make a
profit because the activity was not operated in a businesslike
manner where very little advertising was done, no advice
was sought from experts and the taxpayers made no attempt
to improve the profitability of the activity.  Gircsis v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-244.
IRA'S.  The taxpayers received monthly distributions
from their IRA's based upon an amortization of the amounts
in the accounts at 8 percent interest over the life expectancy
as determined in Table V of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9.  The IRS
ruled that the distributions qualified as a series of
substantially equal periodic payments and were not subject
to additional tax under I.R.C. § 72(t)(1). Ltr. R u l .
9217048, Jan. 31, 1992.
LIKE KIND EXCHANGES.  The taxpayers
transferred a conservation easement in perpetuity on their
farm to the county conservation board in exchange for a fee
simple interest in another farm.  The IRS ruled that the
exchange qualified as a like-kind exchange under I.R.C. §
1031(a) allowing no recognition of gain or loss on the
transaction.  Ltr. Rul. 9215049, Jan. 15, 1992.
PARTNERSHIPS
DEFINITION.  The IRS has ruled that where a
partnership agreement restricts the transfer of more than 20
percent of all interests in partnership capital, income, gain,
loss, deduction and credit, the partnership lacks the element
of free transferability of interests for the purpose of
determining whether the partnership is a partnership for
federal income tax purposes. Rev. Proc. 92-33, I .R.B.
1992-17, 28.
The IRS has ruled that the Utah Limited Partnership
Act, Utah Code §§ 48-2a-1 et seq., corresponds to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act for purposes of Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2. Rev. Rul. 92-34, I.R.B. 1992-
18, 11.
DISTRIBUTIONS.  The taxpayer was a 45 percent
partner in a partnership in which the other partner was a
corporation controlled by the taxpayer's father.  The taxpayer
received distributions from the partnership in excess of the
taxpayer's share of partnership profits.  The court ruled that
the excess distributions were gain includible in income upon
the termination of the partnership and not loans because the
taxpayer did not provide evidence of an enforceable debt
obligation. Seay v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-
254 .
  PASSIVE INVESTMENT INTEREST INCOME.
The taxpayer purchased all the stock of an S corporation
from the taxpayer's father in exchange for cash and a
promissory note secured by the stock.  The taxpayer worked
full time for the corporation as director and chief executive
officer.  The IRS ruled that the interest expense resulting
from the promissory note was to be allocated among the
various assets of the corporation under Notice 89-35, 1989-1
C.B. 675 in order to determine whether the interest expense
is subject to the Section 163(d) limitation.  Because the
taxpayer materially participated in the corporation business,
the interest expense allocated to inventory was not
investment expense subject to the limitations of I.R.C. §
469.  However, interest expense allocated to portfolio
income would be subject to Section 163(d) limitations.
Ltr. Rul. 9215013, Jan. 7, 1992.
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PENSION PLANS .  An employee was not allowed
to use 10-year averaging for a lump sum distribution from
an early retirement program because the program was not a
qualified plan under I.R.C. § 402(a). McKnight v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-241.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, received lump sum
distributions from a profit-sharing plan and an incentive
savings plan.  The distribution from the savings plan was
rolled over to an IRA.  The distribution from the profit
sharing plan was reported as income with a 10-year
averaging election.  The court held that the 10-year
averaging election was available only if elected for all lump
sum distributions; therefore, the 10-year averaging election
only for the profit sharing distribution was not allowed.
Fowler v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. No. 34 (1992).
For plans beginning in April 1992 the weighted average
is 8.35 percent with the permissible range of 7.51 to 9.18
percent for purposes of determining the full funding
limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 92 -21 ,
I.R.B. 1992-17, 12.
The decedent owned an interest in an ERISA qualified
pension plan, and the decedent's first spouse had executed a
waiver of benefits in favor of the plaintiff.  The decedent had
married a second time and had executed prior to marriage an
antenuptial agreement in which the fiance/defendant agreed
to waive all rights and causes of action against the decedent
which could arise as a result of their marriage.  The court
held that the defendant's, the surviving spouse, antenuptial
agreement did not effect a waiver of the surviving spouse's
rights to the ERISA fund because the agreement did not
comply with the waiver requirements of ERISA.  Hurwitz
v. Sher, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 2 1 3
(S.D. N.Y. 1992).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON .  The debtor, a
radiologist, was a shareholder, director and officer in several
corporations which operated other businesses, including an
agricultural cooperative, a timber farm, a trucking firm and a
logging firm.  The IRS assessed the 100 percent penalty
under I.R.C. § 6672 against the debtor as a responsible
person involved in the corporations which failed to pay
withheld employment taxes.  The court held that the debtor
was not a responsible person because the debtor had no
check writing authority, was not involved in the daily
management of the corporations, and had no contact with
the corporations' creditors.  In re  Hughes, 137 B . R .
614 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
The debtor was the wife of the sole shareholder of a
corporation and was a director and officer of the corporation.
The debtor had check writing authority, performed all
corporation bookkeeping, and paid other corporation
creditors while knowing that withheld employment taxes
were unpaid.  The court held that the debtor was a
responsible person subject to the 100 percent penalty of
I.R.C. § 6672.  In re  Zauss, 137 B.R. 682 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1992).
S CORPORATIONS
TAX YEAR.  When the corporation made its S
corporation election, the corporation selected a date other
than a calendar year end as the taxable year.  The taxable
year was rejected by the IRS but the corporation filed its
return based on the requested date.  The corporation then
filed Form 8716 requesting the use of the elected date as its
taxable year end, with a request for extension of time to file
the request. The IRS denied the extension for lack of prompt
action.  Ltr. Rul. 9216032, Jan. 22, 1992.
TIMBER.  The taxpayer, a family owned forest
products company, included its timber holdings in southern
Oregon and northern California in one block for purposes of
computing timber depletion allowance.  The court held that
the two areas of timber were sufficiently similar and
included in one operation to be considered one block under
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3(d)(1).  The court rejected IRS
arguments to require a different means of depletion to more
accurately reflect income because the taxpayer demonstrated
that the blocking method used conformed to industry
practice. RLC Industries Co. v. Comm'r, 98 T . C .
No. 33 (1992).
LABOR
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYER.  The petitioner
was hired by a purchaser of a vineyard to manage the
vineyard with authority to hire and fire employees, set and
pay wages and withholding taxes, establish work hours and
procedures, and purchase needed supplies.  The California
Agricultural Labor Relations Board ruled that the petitioner
was a successor agricultural employer required to bargain in
good faith with the vineyard workers' labor union, the UFW
which had a collective bargaining agreement with the
vineyard's former owner.  The court held that the petitioner
had sufficient authority over management of employees to
be considered an agricultural employer and that the petitioner
was a successor employer because the petitioner also
performed similar duties for the previous lessee of the
vineyard. Michael Hat Farming Co. v. ALRB, 6
Cal.Rptr.2d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
OPTION TO RENEW.  The defendants had entered
into a five year lease of grazing land with the plaintiff which
included an option to renew for an additional five years upon
notice by registered mail and payment of "the amount of
rental offered by some other responsible party."  The
defendant timely sent notice of intent to exercise the option
to renew by registered mail and sent increased rent payment
checks for the first six months of the extended lease.  The
defendant also filed a notice of real estate lease and sent a
copy to the plaintiff.  The plaintiffs attempted to reject the
extended lease by arguing that the rent was inadequate, the
extended lease violated the statute of frauds, and that no lease
existed.  The court held that the extended lease was
enforceable because the defendant complied with the
requirements for exercising the option to renew the lease;
the notice to exercise the lease, the rent checks and letters
between the parties were sufficient memoranda to constitute
writings in support of the extension; and an extension of a
written lease did not need another writing to show existence








   PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST.
A creditor had a judgment lien against the debtor's property
prior to the date the debtor purchased a cotton picker at an
auction.  The debtor had made prior arrangements with a
bank to borrow the money for the picker but because the
amount was unknown until the bidding was completed, the
debtor used funds borrowed from a daughter to buy the
picker.  The debtor then completed the loan and repaid the
daughter.  The bank claimed priority of a purchase money
security interest in the picker over the creditor's judgment
lien under Ga. Code § 11-9-310(1)(d).  The court held that
the bank had a purchase money security interest because the
loan closing was tied to the purchase of the picker.  The
court held that the statutory priority granted to purchase
money security interests did not apply in this case because
the judgment lien was not a security interest granted by the
debtor. Corim, Inc. v. Belvin, 414 S.E.2d 4 9 1
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The plaintiffs defaulted
on their farm mortgage and the farm was sold at a
foreclosure sale to the mortgagee bank.  The plaintiffs sued
the bank for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract
and negligence in granting the loan.  The court held that the
bank did not have a fiduciary duty towards the plaintiffs
because the bank did not control the affairs of the plaintiffs.
The court also denied the claim of breach of good faith
dealing, holding that the action was not recognized in
Michigan.  The breach of contract claim was based on
contract duties imposed by federal statutes and regulations,
but the court denied this claim because the loan agreements
contained all obligations of the parties.  Finally, the court
held that the bank had no duty toward the plaintiffs to
determine the plaintiffs' ability to make the loan payments.
Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 4 8 0
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